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Lecture 12 - Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles

This video was recorded at ECON 159 - Game Theory. We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature. Reading assignment: Handout on ESS in Pure Strategies Resources: Handout on ESS in Pure Strategies [PDF] Blackboard Notes Lecture 12[PDF]

Keywords:: videolectures, ocwc, oec

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Mathematics and Statistics / Mathematics / Discrete Mathematics / Game Theory

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Material Type:: Presentation
Date Added to MERLOT:: February 10, 2015
Date Modified in MERLOT:: February 10, 2015
Author:: Benjamin Polak, Department of Economics, Yale University
Submitter:: The Open Education Consortium
Primary Audience:: College General Ed, College Lower Division, College Upper Division
Technical Format:: Video

Mobile Compatibility:: Not specified at this time
Language:: English
Cost Involved:: No
Source Code Available:: No
Creative Commons:: This work is licensed under a Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States