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Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design

This video was recorded at NIPS ˙08 Workshop: Beyond Search - Computational Intelligence for the Web. This talk describes the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. Using simulations, we consider the changes that result from a search engine's choice of reserve price and from changes in the number of participating advertisers.

Keywords:: videolectures, ocwc, oec

Disciplines:

Science and Technology / Computer Science

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Material Type:: Presentation
Date Added to MERLOT:: February 8, 2015
Date Modified in MERLOT:: February 8, 2015
Author:: Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research
Submitter:: The Open Education Consortium
Primary Audience:: College General Ed, College Lower Division, College Upper Division
Technical Format:: Video

Mobile Compatibility:: Not specified at this time
Language:: English
Cost Involved:: No
Source Code Available:: No
Accessibility Information Available:: Unknown
Creative Commons:: This work is licensed under a Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States